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Abstract 
 
 Using micro data from Duke University quarterly survey of Chief Financial Officers, we 
show that corporate investment plans as well as actual investment are well explained by CFOs’ 
expectations of earnings growth. The information in expectations data is not subsumed by 
traditional variables, such as Tobin’s Q or discount rates. We also show that errors in CFO 
expectations of earnings growth are predictable from past earnings and other data, pointing to 
extrapolative structure of expectations and suggesting that expectations may not be rational. This 
evidence, like earlier findings in finance, points to the usefulness of data on actual expectations 
for understanding economic behavior.     
                                                        
1 We are deeply grateful to John Graham and Campbell Harvey for providing data from the CFO survey, and to Joy Tianjiao 
Tong for helping us to access the data. We thank our discussants Monika Piazzesi and Chris Sims, as well as Gary Chamberlain, 
Martin Eichenbaum, Carlo Favero, Robin Greenwood, Luigi Guiso, Sam Hanson, Chen Lian, Jonathan Parker, Fabiano Schivardi, 
Jim Stock, and Mirko Wiederholt for useful suggestions. We also thank Yang You for research assistance.  
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1. Introduction 
 One of the basic principles of economics in general, and macroeconomics in particular, is 
that expectations influence decisions. In line with this principle, the use of survey-based 
expectations data has been the mainstay of macroeconomic analysis since the 1940s, analyzing 
variables such as railroad shippers’ forecasts. NBER published several volumes on data of this 
kind, such as The Quality and Economic Significance of Anticipations Data (1960), showing that 
forecasts help to explain real decisions by firms, including investment and production.     
 The use of expectations data took a nosedive following the Rational Expectations 
Revolution. First, under rational expectations, the model itself dictates what expectations rational 
agents should hold to be consistent with the model (Muth, 1961), so anticipations data are 
redundant. Second, economists became skeptical about the quality of expectations data; in fact 
this skepticism predates rational expectations (Manski, 2004). According to Prescott (1977), 
“Like utility, expectations are not observed, and surveys cannot be used to test the rational 
expectations hypothesis” (underlining his). In finance, as in macroeconomics, the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis implies that expectations of asset returns are predicted by the model 
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), so expectations data are not 
commonly used.   
 In our view, the marginalization of research on survey expectations deprives economists of 
extremely valuable information. Whether or not survey expectations predict behavior is an 
empirical question. Moreover, the rational expectations assumption should not be taken for 
granted, but rather confronted with actual expectations data, imperfect as they are. Today, we 
have theoretical models that do not rely on the rational expectations assumption and make 
testable predictions, as well as expectations data to compare alternative models. Indeed, Manski 
(2004) argues forcefully and convincingly that expectations data are necessary to distinguish 
alternative models in economics.  
 As an illustration, take the case of finance, where data on expectations of asset returns have 
been rejected as uninformative (e.g. Cochrane, 2011). Yet there is mounting evidence that 
expectations are highly consistent across different surveys of different types of investors, that 
they have a fairly clear extrapolative structure, that they predict investor behavior, and that they 
are useful in predicting returns (e.g., Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). Most important, 
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expectations of returns obtained from surveys are negatively correlated with measures of 
expected returns obtained from rational expectations models. The trouble seems to be with 
conventional rational expectations models of asset prices, not with expectations data.  
The message we take from this discussion is that expectations data can be used to address 
two questions: 1) do expectations affect behavior? and 2) are expectations rational? The 
questions are related. If expectations do not affect behavior, it matters little whether they are 
rational or not. If however expectations do affect behavior, the question of their rationality 
becomes quite relevant, since it allows us to consider alternative models of belief formation 
underlying economic decisions.  
In this paper, we try to answer these questions for the case of corporate investment. We use 
new data assembled by John Graham and Campbell Harvey at Duke University to examine 
expectations formed by Chief Financial Officers of large U.S. corporations and their relationship 
to investment plans and actual investment of these firms. The Duke data are based on quarterly 
surveys of CFOs which, among other things, collect information on earnings growth 
expectations and investment plans. We match these data with Compustat to get information on 
actual investment and other accounting variables. We also consider earnings forecasts made by 
Wall Street financial analysts regarding individual firms, which happen to be highly correlated 
with CFO forecasts.   
 To organize our discussion, we present a simple Q-theory based model of investment, but 
one relying on actual expectations rather than stock market data. We then conduct a number of 
empirical tests suggested by the model of the relationship between earnings growth expectations 
and investment growth, both in the aggregate and firm-level data. The results suggest that 
expectations are statistically and substantively important predictors of both planned and actual 
investment, and have explanatory power beyond traditional variables such as market-based 
proxies of Tobin’s Q, discount rates, measures of financial constraints or uncertainty. We then 
conduct a number of empirical tests on the rationality of expectations. In our data, expectations 
do not appear to be rational in the sense that—both in the aggregate and at the level of individual 
firms—expectational errors are consistently predictable from highly relevant publicly available 
information, such as past profitability. Some evidence points to the extrapolative structure of 
earnings expectations, similar to the evidence from finance.    
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 Our paper is related to several very large strands of research. Most clearly, it is related to a 
large literature on determinants of investment, such as Barro (1990), Hayashi (1982), Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Morck et al. (1990), Lamont (2000), and many others. Four 
papers are particularly closely related to our work. Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006) replace 
the traditional market-based Tobin’s Q used in investment equations by Q computed using 
analyst expectations data, and find that the fit of the equation is much better. Guiso, Pistaferri, 
and Suryanarayanan (2006) use direct expectations data on Italian firms to study the relationship 
between expectations, investment plans, and actual investment. Arif and Lee (2014) use 
accounting data to show that high aggregate investment precedes earnings disappointments, and 
argue that fluctuations in investor sentiment account for the evidence. Greenwood and Hanson 
(2015) study specifically the shipping industry, and find evidence of boom-bust cycles driven by 
volatile (and incorrect) expectations and investment that follows them.  
Our paper is also related to research on expectations in macroeconomics. A large literature 
studies inflation expectations and their rationality (e.g. Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981; Zarnowitz, 
1985; Keane and Runkle, 1990; Ang, Bakaert, and Wei, 2007; Monti, 2010; Del Negro and 
Eusepi, 2011; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, forthcoming; Smets, Warne, and Wouters, 
2014). Souleles (2004) finds that consumer expectations are biased and inefficient, yet are strong 
predictors of household spending. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2015) present a model of 
“social dynamics” in beliefs about home prices, and match the model to survey expectations data. 
Fuhrer (2015) shows that survey expectations improve the performance of DSGE models. Some 
research suggests that analyst expectations of corporate profits are rational at very short horizons 
(Keane and Runkle, 1998), although the overwhelming majority of studies reject rationality of 
analyst forecasts (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; La Porta, 1996; Liu and Su, 
2005; Hribar and McInnis, 2012). There is also a literature on expectations shocks in 
macroeconomics, which generally maintains the assumption of rational expectations (Lorenzoni, 
2009; Angeletos and La’O, 2009; Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar, 2015).  
 Perhaps most closely related to our work is research in behavioral finance, where biases in 
expectations have been examined for many years (e.g., Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1990; 
DeLong et al. 1990). Some of the recent papers include Amronin and Sharpe (forthcoming), 
Bacchetta, Mertens and Wincoop (2009), Hirshleifer and Yu (2012), and Greenwood and Shleifer 
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(2014), to which we return later. Several of these papers find that investor expectations are 
extrapolative. In the bond market, Piazzesi, Salomao, and Schneider (2015) use data on interest 
rate forecasts and also find substantial deviations from rationality. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and 
Fuster et al. (2011) are two recent Macro Annual papers that also address expectations formation 
and rationality.   
 In the next section, we briefly summarize some of the evidence on the relationship between 
investor expectations and asset prices, and address some of the criticisms of expectations data.  
Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents a simple Q-theory model of expectations and 
investment that organizes our empirical work. Section 5 follows with the basic empirical results 
on expectations and investment. Section 6 examines the structure of expectations. Section 7 
concludes with a brief discussion of implications of the evidence for macroeconomics. 
 
2. Recent Research on Expectations and Asset Prices in Finance  
Before turning to our main results on investment, we briefly summarize recent research on 
expectations and stock market returns, which illustrates the usefulness of expectations data. In 
recent models with time-varying expected returns (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Lettau 
and Ludvigson, 2001), expected returns (ER) are given by required returns, which in turn depend 
on consumption: investors require higher returns when consumption is low (relative to some 
benchmark), and lower returns when consumption is high. This research does not generally use 
data on expectations. Rather, it adopts a rational expectations approach in which ERs are 
determined by the model itself, so the ER is inferred from the joint distribution of consumption 
and realized returns.      
As discussed in the introduction, recent work has started to use actual expectations data. For 
our purposes, the most relevant paper is Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). They use data on 
expectations of returns from six different surveys of investors, including a Gallup survey, 
investor newsletters, and the survey of CFOs of large corporations that we use in the current 
paper. The paper reports four main findings relevant to our analysis, which we summarize in 
Tables 1 and 2.    
First, expectations of aggregate stock returns are highly correlated across investor surveys, 
despite the fact that different datasets survey different investors and ask somewhat different 
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questions (see Table 1). These measured expectations are also highly positively correlated with 
equity mutual fund inflows. Survey expectations are thus hardly misleading or uninformative: 
why would they otherwise be strongly correlated across groups, across questions, and with fund 
flows?   
Second, return expectations appear to be extrapolative: they are high after a period of high 
market returns, and low after a period of low market returns (see Table 1 and Figure 1). 
Third, and critically, expectations of returns are strongly negatively correlated with 
model-based measures of the ER (see again Table 1). Put simply, when investors expect returns 
to be high, models predict that the ER is low. A plausible interpretation of this finding is that 
model-based ER does not actually capture expectations.   
Fourth, when expectations of returns are high, and the ER is low, actual returns going 
forward are low (see Table 2). To us, this piece of evidence points to the interpretation, dating 
back to Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988), that high market valuations and consumption reflect 
overvaluation and excessive investor optimism (as directly measured by expectations), and 
portend reversion going forward. Model-based ER, in other words, does not measure 
expectations, but rather proxies for overvaluation. 
We draw two lessons from this analysis. At the most basic level, direct survey estimates of 
expectations are useful: they have a well-defined structure across different surveys, and they 
predict fund flows as well as future returns. Second, to the extent that survey estimates actually 
measure expectations is accepted, the evidence points against rational expectations models of 
stock market valuation. Actual expectations are strongly negatively related to the measures of 
expected returns that these models generate. In the remainder of this paper, we consider some 
related findings for corporate investment.    
 
3. Data for Studying Expectations and Investment 
Our empirical analysis of corporate investment draws on two main categories of data: 1) data 
on expectations, primarily of future profitability, and 2) data on firm financials and investment 
activities. We focus on non-financial firms in the United States. We collect data both at the 
aggregate and at the firm level, and all data are available at quarterly frequencies. Appendix B 
provides a list of the main variables, including their construction and the time range for which 
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each variable is available.  
 
3.1 Expectations Data 
We have data on the expectations of two groups of people: CFOs and equity analysts. We 
first describe these data and then show that expectations of CFOs and equity analysts are highly 
correlated.  
A. CFO Expectations 
Our data on CFO expectations come from the Duke/CFO Magazine Business Outlook 
Survey led by John Graham and Campbell Harvey, which was launched in July 1996 and takes 
place on a quarterly basis. Each quarter, the survey asks CFOs their views about the US economy 
and corporate policies, as well as their expectations of future firm performance and operational 
plans.
2
 Starting in 1998, the CFO survey consistently asks respondents their expectations of the 
future twelve month growth of key corporate variables, including earnings, capital spending, and 
employment, among others. The original question is presented to the CFOs as follows: 
Relative to the previous 12 months, what will be your company's PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
during the next 12 months? (e.g., +3%, -2%, etc.) [Leave blank if not applicable] 
Earnings: ________; Cash on balance sheet: ________; Capital spending: ________;  
Prices of your product: ________; Number of domestic full-time employees: ________;  
Wage: ________; Dividends: ________... 
(Selected items are listed as examples. For a complete listing, please refer to original 
questionnaires posted on the CFO survey’s website.) 
We use CFOs’ answers on earnings growth over the next twelve months as the main proxy 
for CFO expectations of future profitability. As the survey does not ask for expectations beyond 
the next twelve months, we will explain in Section 4 how we interpret and extract information 
from earnings expectations over the next twelve months.  
We then use CFOs’ answers on capital spending growth in the next twelve months as a 
proxy for firms’ current investment plans. In the empirical analysis, we investigate how 
investment plans relate to expectations of future profitability. We adopt this approach in light of 
                                                        
2 Graham and Harvey (2011) provide a detailed description of the survey.  Historical questionnaires are available at 
http://www.cfosurvey.org. 
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well documented lags between decisions to invest and actual investment spending (Lamont, 
2000). With lags in investment implementation, current expectations about future profitability 
may not translate into capital expenditures instantly. Instead, they will affect current investment 
plans, and show up in actual investment spending with some delay. As a result, it can be more 
straightforward to detect the impact of earnings expectations by looking at investment plans. We 
discuss this issue in more detail in Sections 4 and 5.  
Our analyses use both aggregate time series and firm-level panel data. Aggregate variables 
are revenue-weighted averages of firm-level responses, and they are published on the CFO 
survey’s website. While the survey does not require CFOs to identify themselves, some 
respondents voluntarily disclose this information. It is then possible to match a fraction of the 
firm-level responses with data from CRSP and Compustat to perform firm-level tests. For 
example, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) use matched firm-level data to study how 
managerial miscalibration affects corporate financial policies. Because there are privacy 
restrictions associated with these data, Graham and Harvey helped us implement firm-level 
analysis using a subsample of their matched dataset. The firm-level data we use has 1,133 
firm-year observations, spanning from 2005Q1 to 2012Q4.
3
 We exclude firms that have 
negative earnings in the past twelve months because in that case earnings growth is not 
well-defined. We also winsorize outliers at the 1% level.  
B. Analyst Expectations 
We obtain data on equity analysts’ expectations of future firm performance from the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) dataset. Beginning in the 1980s, IBES collects 
analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (EPS) for the next one to up to twelve quarters. 
We take consensus EPS forecasts (i.e. average forecast for a given firm-quarter in the future) and 
compute forecasts of total earnings by multiplying by the number of shares outstanding. To 
compare the results with those using CFO expectations, we compute analyst expectations of 
future twelve months earnings growth. We calculate aggregate analyst expectations of future 
twelve months earnings growth by summing up expected future earnings of all firms in the next 
four quarters, and then divide by the sum of earnings of all firms in the past four quarters. We 
calculate firm-level analyst expectations of future earnings growth by taking the forecast of total 
                                                        
3 The number of observations in our firm-level regressions can be smaller because some respondents do not answer all questions.  
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firm earnings in the next four quarters, and then divide by total earnings in the past four quarters. 
We exclude firms that have negative earnings in the past twelve months when calculating 
expected future earnings growth.  
The sample with analyst expectations covers both a longer time span and a larger set of firms. 
We set the start date of the aggregate time series and firm panel to be 1985Q1 because some of 
the quarterly Compustat data items we use only become systematically available around 1985 
and because aggregate analyst forecasts have some outliers before 1985. We set the end of the 
sample to be 2012Q4 so we can match expectations to realized next twelve month earnings 
growth with accounting data ending in 2013Q4. In total, we have 145,281 firm-level 
observations of expected earnings growth over the next twelve months, and we winsorize 
outliers at the 5% level. 
C. Correlation between CFO and Analyst Expectations 
The expectations of CFOs and analysts with respect to next twelve month earnings growth 
are highly correlated. Figure 2 shows aggregate time series of expected next twelve month 
earnings growth from the CFO survey and from analyst forecasts. The raw correlation between 
these two series is 0.65. At the firm level, the raw correlation between CFO and analyst 
expectations of next twelve month earnings growth is 0.4 if we demean by firm, and 0.3 if we 
demean by both firm and time. The high correlation between expectations of CFOs and analysts 
indicate that expectations data are consistent and meaningful, and expectations of both groups 
incorporate information about general business outlook shared by managers and the market. 
 
3.2 Firm Financials Data 
We collect aggregate data on firm assets and investment from the Flow of Funds (Table F.102 
and Table B.102) and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and firm-level data 
from Compustat. A key variable in our analysis is realized earnings, which we use to assess the 
accuracy of earnings expectations of CFOs and analysts. While Compustat mainly records 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) earnings, managers and analysts often use 
so-called “pro forma earnings” (also called “Street earnings”) which adjust for certain 
non-recurring items (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, Larsen, 
2003). To make sure we use the same measure of earnings as CFOs and analysts, we collect 
10 
 
realized earnings from IBES Actuals files, which closely track earnings as reported by 
companies in their earnings announcements. These are the numbers that analyst forecasts aim to 
match and the earnings metric that managers tend to use the most.
4
 In the rest of the paper we 
refer to IBES actual earnings as “earnings”, and GAAP earnings as “net income”.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of firms for which we have firm-level CFO expectations 
(Panel A) and analyst expectations (Panel B), as well as all non-financial firms in Compustat 
(Panel C). For comparability, the statistics in Panel B and Panel C are generated based on the 
time period for which we have firm-level CFO expectations (i.e. from 2005 through 2012). We 
can see that firms with analyst expectations are mostly larger than the median Compustat firm, 
and firms with CFO expectations are generally even larger. Firms with CFO and analyst 
expectations also appear to be more profitable than firms in the full Compustat sample in terms 
of net income, but otherwise very similar in terms of sales, investment, book-to-market, and Q.  
 
4. Expectations and Firm Investment: Empirical Specifications 
We motivate our empirical specification with a basic Q-theory model. A firm is run by a risk 
neutral owner who discounts the future by factor 𝛽 < 1,5 and the firm’s horizon is infinite. In 
the model, we interpret each period 𝑡 to be twelve months. The firm’s output in period 𝑡 is 
obtained by combining capital and labor using a constant returns to scale production function 
𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼. At the beginning of period 𝑡, the owner hires labor 𝐿𝑡 at wage 𝑤 and makes 
decisions about investment during this year 𝐼𝑡. Investment takes one year to implement, so 
𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡, where 𝛿 is capital depreciation rate. The firm’s optimal policy in year 𝑡 
maximizes the expected present value of earnings:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐼𝑠,𝐿𝑠}𝑠≥𝑡𝔼𝑡 {∑ 𝛽
𝑠−𝑡[𝐴𝑠𝐾𝑠
𝛼𝐿𝑠
1−𝛼 − 𝑤𝐿𝑠 − 𝐶(𝐼𝑠, 𝐾𝑠)]
𝑠≥𝑡
}     
subject to 𝐾𝑠+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑠 + 𝐼𝑠. We assume the commonly used quadratic investment costs: 
𝐶(𝐼𝑠, 𝐾𝑠) − 𝐼𝑠 =
𝑏
2
(
𝐼𝑠
𝐾𝑠
− 𝑎)
2
𝐾𝑠,                                                              
which allow for convex adjustment costs (𝑏 > 0) and displays constant returns to scale.  
                                                        
4 We performed detailed checks and verified that IBES actual earnings indeed appear to be closest to forecasts by managers and 
analysts, in terms of accounting treatment, magnitude, variance, and variation over time.  
5 The assumption of risk neutrality and constant discount rate is for simplicity of exposition. The framework can be extended to 
incorporate time-varying discount rates, as derived in Lettau and Ludvigson (2002). In our empirical analysis in Section 4.2 and 
Section 4.3, we will explicitly consider time-varying discount rates. 
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In the optimization problem above, the operator 𝔼𝑡(. ) denotes the owner’s expectations 
conditional on his information at the beginning of year 𝑡, computed according to his possibly 
distorted beliefs. We allow for departures from rational expectations, but restrict to beliefs that 
preserve the law of iterated expectations. By standard arguments, Appendix A shows that the 
firm’s optimal investment chosen at the beginning of year 𝑡 is described by: 
𝐼𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= (𝑎 −
1
𝑏
) +
𝛽
𝑏
𝔼𝑡[∑ 𝛽
𝑠−(𝑡+1)Π𝑠𝑠≥𝑡+1 ]
𝐾𝑡+1
.                                             (1) 
where Π𝑠 = 𝐴𝑠𝐾𝑠
𝛼𝐿𝑠
1−𝛼 − 𝑤𝐿𝑠 − 𝐶(𝐼𝑠, 𝐾𝑠) denotes the firm’s earnings in year s. Equation (1) 
corresponds to a generic Q-theory equation with quadratic adjustment costs, which takes the 
form 𝐼𝑡/𝐾𝑡 = 𝜂 + 𝛾𝑄𝑡. 
 To estimate Equation (1), ideally we would like to know expectations of earnings in all 
future periods. This is unfortunately not feasible in practice. For instance, CFOs only report 
expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. Formally, in the CFO survey we only 
have information about 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡), namely expectations at the beginning of year 𝑡 about earnings 
Π𝑡 in the following twelve months (which are not yet known, so expectations are well-defined). 
With respect to investment, we have information on: i) planned investment over the next twelve 
months, and ii) actual capital spending in each quarter. We denote investment plans for the next 
twelve months as 𝐼𝑡
𝑝
, which captures the plan made at the beginning of the year about 
investment in the rest of the year. 
Given implementation lags in the investment process, it may be most straightforward to test 
how expectations at a given point in time affect firms’ investment plans.6 Accordingly, we 
approximate Equation (1) by 
𝐼𝑡
𝑝
𝐾𝑡
≈ 𝜃0 + 𝜃1
𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡)
𝐾𝑡
                                                                (2) 
This approximation is reliable if expectations about the level of future earnings display 
significant persistence, namely 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡)/𝐾𝑡  is not too far from 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡+1)/𝐾𝑡+1  and more 
                                                        
6 Plans are particularly helpful in the context of our data, where we observe forward looking expectations once a quarter rather 
than once a year. With lags in investment implementation, it is unlikely that expectations in a given quarter will be immediately 
reflected in capital spending in the same quarter, or even fully incorporated into capital spending in the next quarter. In 
comparison, investment plans would be more responsive to contemporaneous expectations. When managers become more 
optimistic, they would revise their plans upward. As plans get implemented over time, the impact on actual capital expenditures 
can show up with some delay. For this reason, it is more straightforward to start testing the impact of expectations by looking at 
investment plans.  
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generally for earnings further away in the future. We find this assumption to be plausible based 
on information in the data. Empirically earnings over assets are relatively persistent, and 
moreover, are perceived to be very persistent based on analyst forecasts. The IBES dataset 
provides analysts’ forecasts of future earnings for up to twelve quarters. With firm-level forecasts, 
we find 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑖,𝑡+1)/𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0.83𝔼𝑡(Π𝑖,𝑡)/𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝔼𝑡(Π𝑖,𝑡+2)/𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0.73𝔼𝑡(Π𝑖,𝑡)/𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . Aggregate persistence implied by analyst 
forecasts is similar. In addition, lagged profitability is not significant if included in these 
regressions and neither does it affect coefficients on 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑖,𝑡)/𝐾𝑖,𝑡. These results suggest that 
next one year expectations incorporate a significant amount of information about medium to long 
term expectations. We showed in Section 3 that CFO and analyst expectations are highly 
correlated, and it is probable that their beliefs share common structures.  
Given this corroborating evidence, it appears that within the limitations of our data, 
Equation (2) is a reasonable approximation of Equation (1). For the purpose of our empirical 
analysis, it is convenient to log-linearize Equation (2) and express it in growth rates, since all 
variables in the CFO survey are in terms of percentage change in the next twelve months relative 
to the past twelve months. By expressing Equation (2) in growth rates we can directly employ 
these variables, without using them to reconstruct levels. If we denote logs by lowercase 
variables, then derivations in Appendix A show that our equation for investment plans can be 
approximated as:      
𝑖𝑡
𝑝 − 𝑖𝑡−1⏟    
planned investment growth 
in the next 12m
≈ 𝜇1 [𝔼𝑡(𝜋𝑡) − 𝜋𝑡−1]⏟          
expectations of earnings growth 
in the next 12m
+ (1 − 𝜇1)(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡−1)                        (3)   
where 𝜇0, 𝜇1 are log-linearization constants (𝜇1 > 0). The left hand side term is planned 
investment growth in the next twelve months, which is available from the CFO survey. The first 
term on the right hand side of Equation (3) is expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve 
months, which we also observe directly in the data. This specification is very similar to previous 
studies of investment growth such as Barro (1990), Lamont (2000), and many others.  
The intuition of Equation (3) is as follows: When firms think that earnings will increase by a 
lot in the next twelve months, they also tend to believe that future earnings will be higher for a 
sustained period of time. As a result, they want to invest more, which leads to an immediate 
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increase in planned investment. In Equation (3) we need to control for the change in capital stock 
because both investment and profitability are affected by the size of capital stock. We can also 
arrive at a specification very similar to Equation (3) in a simpler setting with time to build but 
without adjustment costs.
7
 Empirically we use Equation (3) to map a basic investment model to 
testable predictions in our dataset. We refrain from testing the parameter restrictions implied by a 
strict adherence to the approximated Q equation.  
While investment plans are a convenient starting point to detect the impact of expectations, 
for Equation (2) to be informative about how expectations influence investment, it must also be 
the case that plans are closely related to realizations. In Section 5.3, we show that investment 
plans are highly correlated with actual capital spending over the planned period. In other words, 
a significant fraction of capital spending over the next few quarters appears to be determined by 
ex ante investment plans, consistent with previous findings by Lamont (2000). To the extent that 
there is a close correspondence between investment plans and realized investment over the 
planned period, it would also be of interest to test how current expectations translate into actual 
capital spending in the next twelve months. This additional test allows us to further assess 
whether expectations have a substantial impact on actual investment activities. We present results 
from these tests in Section 5.3. 
 
5. Expectations and Investment 
In this section, we test the relationship between investment decisions and earnings 
expectations. We focus on CFO expectations, and provide supplementary results using 
expectations of equity analysts. We begin by studying investment plans. In Section 5.1 we 
consider the role of expectations at the aggregate level, and in Section 5.2 we consider the role of 
                                                        
7
 One might also consider an alternative approximation of Equation (1) of the following form 𝐼𝑡−1/ 𝐾𝑡−1 ≈ 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡)/𝐾𝑡   
where 𝐼𝑡−1 denotes realized investment in the past twelve months, and 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡), as before, is current expectations of earnings in 
the next twelve months. This approximation is reasonable under two conditions. As in the case of Equation (2), it should be that 
expectations over future earnings are stable. Moreover, it has to be that respondents received little information and barely updated 
their beliefs in the past twelve months, so that current expectations about next twelve month earnings, namely 𝔼𝑡(Π𝑡), is close to 
expectations four quarters ago about earnings over the same period, namely 𝔼𝑡−1(Π𝑡). We find this approximation to be less 
tenable for several reasons. First, from time to time new information arrives over a twelve month period that has a significant 
impact on people’s beliefs. (This can happen even if earnings processes are highly persistent, for example, if it is a random walk.) 
Second, given implementation lags in real world investment activities, actual capital spending over a twelve month period tends 
to be particularly influenced by decisions made at the beginning of the period. As a result, realized capital spending in year 𝑡 − 1, 
𝐼𝑡−1, may not be well explained by expectations at the end of year 𝑡 − 1. In light of these observations, we use the approximation 
in Equation (2) in the rest of our analysis. 
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expectations at the firm level. Then, in Section 5.3 we evaluate the relationship between plans 
and realized investment, and document the link between expectations and actual capital 
spending. 
 
5.1 Expectations and Investment Plans: Aggregate Evidence 
Figure 3 visually represents the association between aggregate CFO expectations and 
aggregate investment. Panel A plots CFOs’ expectations of next twelve month earnings growth, 
along with planned investment growth in the next twelve months. Panel B adds to Panel A actual 
aggregate investment growth in the next twelve months. We see that there is a strong 
comovement between earnings expectations and investment plans, and between investment plans 
and actual capital spending. At the very least, expectations data do not appear to be 
uninformative noise.     
We then estimate versions of Equation (3) using quarterly regressions: 
∆CAPX̂q𝑡 = α + βEq𝑡
∗ [∆Earnings] + λXq𝑡 + ϵq𝑡  
where ∆CAPX̂q𝑡 is planned investment growth in the next twelve months reported in quarter q𝑡, 
and Eq𝑡
∗ [∆Earnings] is CFO expectations of next twelve month earnings growth reported in 
quarter q𝑡. Xq𝑡 includes past change in capital stock as shown in Equation (3), as well as a set 
of additional controls we discuss below. We use Newey-West standard errors with twelve lags.
8
  
Table (4) columns (1) and (2) report our baseline results. We find that CFOs’ earnings 
expectations have significant explanatory power for firms’ investment plans, both statistically 
and economically. A one standard deviation increase in earnings growth expectations is 
associated with a 0.8 standard deviation increase in planned investment growth.
9
 Put differently, 
a one percentage point increase in CFO expectations is accompanied by a 0.6 percentage point 
increase in planned investment growth.
10
 Quantitatively, CFO expectations have major 
                                                        
8 We check the autocorrelation structure of the errors: Autocorrelations are mostly limited to the first four lags, due to the 
overlapping structure of our data; autocorrelations after four lags are minimal. Our empirical results are not sensitive to 
alternative choices of Newey-West lags. 
9 At the aggregate level, during the period where we have CFO expectations data, the standard deviation of planned investment 
growth is about 0.05, and the standard deviation of earnings growth expectations is 0.07. 0.07*0.6/0.05=0.8. 
10 Due to lags in investment implementation it is also possible that, at a given quarter, part of the capital spending that firms 
expect to make in the next twelve months are determined by decisions made, for example, in the last quarter, and therefore 
affected by expectations then. In aggregate data, we can include lagged expectations, in which case current expectations and past 
expectations with two lags are significant, and jointly highly significant. Unfortunately, it is difficult to include lagged 
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explanatory power for aggregate investment.  
In interpreting these results, three issues arise. First, how do CFO expectations relate to 
traditional proxies of Tobin’s Q? Do data on managers’ expectations contain information beyond 
market price-based measures of Q? Second, is the role of expectations robust to controlling for 
alternative theories of corporate investment? Third, could the correlation between expectations 
and investment reflect a reverse causality problem, whereby investment affects expectations of 
future earnings rather than the other way around? In the following, we address these issues by 
augmenting our baseline regressions. 
Some variables may affect investment but are likely to do so only through their influence on 
expectations, such as information relevant for predicting future product demand. In principle, a 
large part of expectations are formed, perfectly or imperfectly, based on observable information, 
instead of being exogenous innovations. Thus a flexible enough function of observable 
information should be able to approximate expectations. The focus of our present analysis is to 
test the extent to which expectations as a whole, as measured in our data, affect firms’ investment 
decisions. It is not specifically about the impact of variations in expectations which are not 
explained by observables (so called “expectatxional shocks”). Accordingly, we do not explore 
whether our expectations variables can or cannot be driven out by a full set of factors that are 
primarily used to explain expectations. Instead, we emphasize controls that represent alternative 
determinants of investment (such as discount rates, financial constraints, etc.).
11
 
 
5.1.1. CFO Expectations and Market-based Proxies for Tobin’s Q         
We begin with a comparison of CFO expectations and traditional proxies of Tobin’s Q. This 
exercise helps us assess whether expectations data contain additional information relative to 
standard market-based Q measures. In Table 4 column (3), we include the empirical proxy of Q. 
In line with previous research, the explanatory power of equity Q is very weak. It is well known 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
expectations in firm-level tests, since we do not always observe individual firms continuously. Therefore, in the baseline 
specifications we include only current expectations. 
11 We thank our discussant Chris Sims for the suggestion of a more careful examination of the role of expectational shocks, as 
well as the feedback among different variables, through VARs. To the extent that expectations experience a meaningful amount of 
exogenous shocks above and beyond reactions to observable information (so that what appear to be expectational shocks is not 
simply measurement error), studying expectational shocks may improve identification. It would also be ideal to have a longer 
time series (we currently only have 57 quarterly observations of CFO expectations and 112 quarterly observations of analyst 
expectations) to reliably estimate the dynamic relationships. In our first-step analysis, we study the impact of measured 
expectations as a whole to show the basic core facts. The investigation of expectational shocks is an interesting issue that we 
leave to future research.  
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that equity Q is highly persistent and does not line up well with fluctuations in investment 
activities. In our context, to explain investment growth, the direct theoretical counterpart is not Q 
in levels, but the log change in Q. Barro (1990) shows changes in Q are almost equivalent to 
stock returns. He finds that changes in Q from the beginning of year 𝑡 − 1 to the beginning of 
year 𝑡 is highly correlated with investment growth in year 𝑡, and stock returns from the 
beginning of year 𝑡 − 1 to the beginning of year 𝑡 perform incrementally better. In column (4), 
we include past twelve month stock returns. The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
statistically significant, as predicted by theory. The coefficient on CFO expectations remains 
large and highly significant.
12
 The views of CFOs appear to contain a substantial amount of 
additional information for investment plans not captured by equity Q.  
Philippon (2009) finds that a proxy of Q obtained from bond yields is also highly correlated 
with investment activities. Philippon’s bond Q series end in 2007, which is five years before the 
end of our sample. However, bond Q is highly correlated with credit spread. For example, the 
correlation between changes in bond Q and changes in credit spread over four quarters is 0.84. In 
column (5), we include changes in credit spread in the past four quarters in lieu of bond Q. In 
addition, credit spread can be relevant as a control also because it may reflect credit availability 
and financial constraints. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant—consistent 
with theory—but CFO expectations retain significant explanatory power.  
Overall, CFO expectations explain investment plans beyond market-based Q proxies, 
statistically and economically. Indeed, CFOs may possess information that markets participants 
either do not possess or process imperfectly. To the extent that managers’ and markets’ views 
differ, it is natural that managers’ beliefs have a major impact on investment decisions. As we 
show in Section 5.3, this result also extends to actual capital spending.  
 
5.1.2. CFO Expectations and Alternative Theories of Investment 
We now test the role of expectations against alternative theories of investment. We introduce 
a set of variables motivated by these theories, which are the key controls in our analysis. 
Time-varying Discount Rates 
                                                        
12 As illustrated in Section 4, proxies of Q are supposed to represent the Q model precisely, whereas survey data can only 
represent it approximately. Thus it may not be surprising that Q proxies remain significant in regressions that include survey 
expectations.  
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A prominent idea in traditional finance holds that variations in required returns, or discount 
rates, are central to explaining investment in both financial and real assets (e.g. Cochrane 1991, 
2011). Lamont (2000) postulates that firm investments rise and fall in response to changes in 
discount rates so that high investment growth is associated with low future stock returns. Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2002) argue that time-varying risk premia, as proxied for by the 
consumption-wealth ratio (known as cay), can forecast future investment growth. In Table 4 
columns (6) to (8), we control for three common measures of discount rates: log dividend yield, 
cay, and the surplus consumption ratio as constructed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999). cay is 
somewhat significant, surplus consumption is not, and dividend yield tends to enter with the 
wrong sign. The explanatory power of CFO expectations is unaffected. We get similar results if 
we include these variables in past twelve month changes instead of in levels. 
We can also control for risk premia implied by long run risks models, as constructed by 
Bansal, Kiku, Shaliastovich, and Yaron (2014). Unfortunately their series is annual, which leaves 
us with few observations. We interpolate the series to quarterly frequencies in multiple ways and 
find it tends to enter with the wrong sign. Taken together, none of these variables compare in 
their explanatory power to CFO expectations, and their inclusion does not have much of an 
influence on the coefficient on expectations.
13
   
Because proxies for discount rates are generally quite persistent, their coefficients can suffer 
from Stambaugh (1999) biases. In our case, Stambaugh bias will tend to attenuate the 
coefficients on discount rates toward zero or make them have the wrong sign.
14
 In Appendix C 
Table C6, we report Stambaugh bias adjusted results, using a multivariate version of the 
bootstrap method in Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006). The bias adjusted results are very 
similar. 
Financing Constraints 
A well-known empirical result, dating back to Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), is that 
investment is positively correlated with recent firm cash flows. The leading interpretation is that 
                                                        
13 Our results also resonate with recent findings by Sharpe and Suarez (2013) and Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2014) that 
changes in discount rates and user cost of capital have limited impact on investment, and that corporations appear to apply 
constant hurdle rates in making investment decisions.  
14 Stambaugh bias arises when predictor variables are relatively persistent, and innovations in predictor variables and outcome 
variables are correlated. In theory, investment should be high when discount rates are low. Thus we would expect a negative 
coefficient on discount rates. To the extent that innovations in investment and discount rates are negatively correlated, Stambaugh 
bias will be upward, pushing the coefficient on discount rates closer to or above zero.  
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financially constrained firms invest more when high cash flows increase internal resources. In 
column (9), we control for cash flows in the past twelve months.
15
 We can include cash flow 
variables either in levels or in changes, and results are similar: The coefficient on expectations 
barely changes, and the coefficient on past cash flows tends to be insignificant. This result 
confirms earlier findings by Cummins et al. (2006) that unveil the fragility of financial constraint 
variables once earnings expectations are taken into account.  
Economic Uncertainty 
A blooming literature studies the impact of uncertainty on economic activities when 
investment is irreversible or has fixed adjustment costs (Leahy and Whited, 1996; Guiso and 
Parigi, 1999; Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009, among others). During periods 
of high uncertainty, the theory goes, managers do not want to exercise the option of investing: 
they prefer to wait for better times and information. It is legitimate to ask whether our measure 
of CFO expectations still matters when we include proxies for uncertainty in our regression.  
In Table 4 column (10), we include stock price volatility as a standard uncertainty proxy 
following Leahy and Whited (1996) and Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), together with 
economic policy uncertainty as measured by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013). We can use these 
variables in levels or in past twelve month changes. In either case, these uncertainty proxies have 
only weak explanatory power, and the coefficient on CFO earnings expectations remains highly 
significant. 
In Table 4 columns (11) and (12), we additionally control for past GDP growth and past 
investment growth. In the last column, we include multiple controls together. The statistical and 
economic significance of CFO expectations remains largely intact. 
 Overall, these tests illustrate that CFO earnings expectations have significant explanatory 
power that is not accounted for by variables capturing alternative theories, such as time-varying 
discount rates, financial constraints, and uncertainty. As we show below, similar results hold 
when we connect expectations to actual capital spending. Our results suggest that expectations 
data provide substantive information about fluctuations in aggregate investment, and changes in 
expectations can be central to understanding investment activities.  
                                                        
15 Here we use past net income rather than pro forma earnings to be conservative, since the actual internal resources that firms 
gain from cash flows need to deduct most of the extraordinary items. Results using either form of profit metric to control for past 
cash flows are very similar.  
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5.1.3. Reverse Causality  
One possible concern is our baseline results could be affected by reverse causality. 
Specifically, if a firm plans to invest a lot in the next twelve months, managers might also expect 
earnings to increase as investment leads to more output and sales. This mechanism seems 
unlikely to be driving our results. First, investment in the next twelve months generally does not 
translate into output and sales immediately. Second, even if it does, investment is an incremental 
addition to the capital stock. It is unlikely that a one percent increase in investment (which 
increases the firm’s capital stock by much less than one percent) can instantly lead to a one 
percent or more increase in firm earnings, as would be required to match the magnitude of 
coefficients in the data.  
We further address the reverse causality concern in supplementary tests, drawing on another 
question in the CFO survey, which asks respondents to rate their optimism about the US 
economy on a scale from 0 to 100 (with 0 being the least optimistic and 100 the most optimistic). 
In Appendix C Table C1, we show that CFOs’ optimism about the US economy is significantly 
positively correlated with investment. It is hard to argue that firms’ investment plans will 
mechanically cause CFOs to be more optimistic about the US economy. Instead, this result is 
very much in line with previous findings that firms’ expectations and sentiments appear to be a 
key driver of investment activities. 
 
 In Appendix C Table C2, we present the same set of tests using analyst expectations. We find 
analyst expectations are also significantly correlated with investment plans, although not 
surprisingly the magnitude of the relationship is smaller; the coefficients on analyst expectations 
are generally about one half of the size of the coefficients on CFO expectations. The evidence 
suggests that expectations elicited from different sources are consistent, and there are general 
views shared by managers and the market that play an important role in shaping aggregate 
investment dynamics.  
 
5.2 Expectations and Investment Plans: Firm-level Evidence 
In Table 5, we repeat our analysis at the firm level. As before, we start with CFO data. We 
estimate 
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∆CAPX̂i,q𝑡 = α + ζ𝑖 + βE𝑖,q𝑡
∗ [∆Earnings𝑖] + λXi,q𝑡 + ϵi,q𝑡 
We report baseline results with firm fixed effects. Results are very similar without fixed effects, 
or with dynamic panel estimators.
16
 Table 5 shows that at the firm level, CFO expectations 
continue to have substantial explanatory power for investment decisions. The response of a 
firm’s investment plans to CFO expectations is similar in magnitude to the relationship unveiled 
in the aggregate analysis of Table 4: When CFOs expect earnings growth to increase by one 
percentage point, planned investment growth increases by 0.4 percentage points on average. We 
then compare CFO expectations with firm-level Q and past twelve month firm stock returns. We 
use the book-to-market ratio as a proxy for firm-level required returns, and all other firm-level 
controls directly correspond to their aggregate counterparts in Table 4. After including these 
controls, alone or together, CFO expectations remain statistically and economically significant. 
We also examine results adding time fixed effects and the findings are similar.   
In Appendix C Table C3 we replicate the firm-level analysis with analyst expectations. The 
results show that analyst expectations about a firm’s earnings growth can also explain investment 
plans. As before, the size of the coefficients on analyst expectations is about one half of that on 
CFO expectations. While CFO expectations play a more dominant role, business outlook shared 
by managers and specialist analysts is nonetheless informative about investment decisions.  
 
5.3 From Plans to Realized Investment 
A premise for our analysis in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is that investment plans are key 
determinants of actual capital spending. With lags in investment implementation, expectations in 
a given quarter may not translate into realized investment instantly, so changes in plans can help 
us pinpoint the impact of expectations, and plans will turn into capital expenditures over a period 
of time. In this section, we evaluate this proposition empirically. In Figure 3 Panel B it is evident 
that, at the aggregate level, plans and realized investment over the planned period are closely 
related. The raw correlation between the two series is 0.78.
17
 Figure 3 Panel B also shows that 
                                                        
16 To the extent that strict exogeneity may not be satisfied, fixed effect estimators may be biased in finite sample. In our context, 
it will bias the coefficient on earnings expectations downwards. Regressions without fixed effects and those using dynamic panel 
methods show that the bias does not appear to be very important. Given that we do not always continuously observe individual 
firms in the CFO sample, it is difficult to take first differences and use lagged instruments. Instead, for dynamic panel estimations 
we apply the forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) transformation as in Arellano and Bover (1995).  
17 Figure 2 uses aggregate investment as measured by private non-residential fixed investment from NIPA. We can alternatively 
use capital expenditures data from Flow of Funds or Compustat, and results are very similar. 
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realized investment is highly correlated with investment plans fitted on CFO expectations. 
Expectations are a key driver not only of investment plans, but also of actual capital spending.  
 In Table 6 and Table 7, we present a full set of results using CFO earnings expectations in a 
given quarter to forecast actual investment growth in the next twelve months, both in the 
aggregate and at the firm level. We find that expectations, and CFO expectations in particular, 
have substantial forecasting power for realized next twelve month investment. Both in the 
aggregate and at the firm level, a one percentage point increase in CFO earnings growth 
expectations predicts a 0.6 percentage point increase in actual investment growth in the next 
twelve months. The performance of past stock returns and changes in credit spread has some 
improvements, but expectations data retain significant power; they are very informative about 
realized capital spending both alone and in the presence of a list of important controls.  
 
 Taken together, evidence in this section shows that expectations data are highly relevant for 
understanding corporate investment. They are not simply noise, but contain considerable 
information for explaining investment activities beyond a host of traditional variables.  
 
6. Are Expectations Rational? 
Since expectations shape investment, it is critical to understand their determinants. We now 
take a first step in analyzing the structure of CFO and analyst expectations about future earnings 
growth. In particular, we check whether expectations of managers and market participants are 
consistent with rational benchmarks, or are systematically biased in predictable ways.  
The simplest test of rational expectations is to run a regression with realized future earnings 
growth on the left hand side and ex ante expectations on the right hand side. In our context, such 
tests take the form:  
∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖⏟        
realized next 12m 
earnings growth
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 E𝑖,q𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖]⏟            
expected next 12m 
earnings growth
+𝜔𝑖,𝑡+1 
where 𝑖 is a firm index, ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 denotes realized earnings growth in the next twelve 
months, and E𝑖,q𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖] denotes expectations of next twelve month earnings growth 
reported in quarter q𝑡. The test can be augmented by including on the right hand side a set of 
variables that are within time 𝑡 information set.  
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Rational expectations postulate that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1 (and a zero coefficient on any other 
variable in time 𝑡 information set). Using both CFO and analyst expectations, we find β to be 
significantly lower than one, and a list of variables known at time 𝑡 enter significantly. This 
finding, however, does not necessarily mean that expectations are excessively volatile relative to 
outcomes. It could be that expectations are measured with error, which would cause a downward 
bias in β.  
An alternative approach is to study the predictability of ex-post expectational errors. If 
expectations are rational, forecast errors should be orthogonal to all information available at the 
time when the forecast is made, and forecast errors should be unpredictable. If, on the other hand, 
expectations are systematically biased, then ex post errors would be predictable using 
information available ex ante. In this case, the structure of error predictability could help us 
understand potential sources of excessive optimism and pessimism. 
 To take a first look, consider Figure 4. Panel A shows errors in aggregate CFO expectations 
about next twelve month earnings growth against past year corporate profitability. Panel B shows 
the same series using analysts’ expectations data.18  The figures show a striking pattern: 
expectational errors appear to be systematic and recurring. In particular, they are consistent with 
the presence of excessive optimism in good times and excessive pessimism in bad times: future 
realized earnings growth systematically falls short of expectations when past earnings are high, 
and exceeds expectations when past earnings are low.
19
 
To statistically corroborate the patterns in Figure 4, we present regressions of expectational 
errors on past profitability. Column (1) of Table 8 Panel A reports the results using CFO data. 
Column (1) of Table 9 Panel A reports the results using analyst data. In both cases, high past year 
profitability is correlated with over-optimism, while low past year profitability is correlated with 
over-pessimism.
20
 The magnitude of the bias is large. A one standard deviation increase in past 
                                                        
18 The errors are computed as aggregate realized next twelve month earnings growth – aggregate CFO (analyst) expectations of 
next twelve month earnings growth. As we cannot identify the full set of firms that answer the CFO survey in each quarter, this 
sample may differ from the full sample with which we use to compute aggregate realized earnings growth. For robustness, to 
make sure that aggregate earnings growth patterns are representative, we alternatively compute aggregate earnings growth by 
taking the mean or median earnings growth in each quarter. We find this makes very little difference, and we get consistent 
empirical results in all cases.  
19 Note that earnings in quarter 𝑡 are typically announced several weeks into quarter 𝑡 + 1, thus we use earnings from quarter 
𝑡 − 5 through 𝑡 − 2 to compute past year profitability, so as to ensure that all information in the predictor variable is strictly in 
the information set of CFOs and analysts when they make forecasts in quarter 𝑡. 
20 To address concerns that past year profitability is relatively persistent (though it is much less persistent than variables like 
discount rate proxies), we present bootstrap bias adjusted results in Appendix C Table C7. We find very similar results.  
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profitability is associated with a 0.6 standard deviation increase in the magnitude of CFOs’ 
expectational errors.
21 Figure 5 further illustrates these results with scatter plots of expectational 
errors against past profitability. It shows that the bias is present throughout the sample period, 
and not driven by a single outlier event. 
Column (2) in Panel A of Tables 8 and 9 correlate expectational errors with past GDP growth 
to check whether over-optimism and over-pessimism are predictable by aggregate economic 
performance. We also find higher past GDP growth is associated with over-optimism, and vice 
versa (although the statistical significance on past GDP growth is a bit lower).
22
  
One way to interpret these results is that expectations depart from rationality in the direction 
of being extrapolative: when CFOs or analysts observe good or bad earnings realization, they 
think that similar realization persists into the future and fail to correct for mean reversion. To 
illustrate, we separately examine, and then compare, how actual future earnings growth and 
expected future earnings growth correlate with past year profitability. When past year earnings 
over assets increase by one percentage point, actual earnings growth in the next twelve months 
on average slows down by 0.12. However, CFOs only expect next twelve month earnings growth 
to slow down by about 0.03. The difference between the true and perceived reversion 
corresponds to the coefficient of -0.09 in Panel A column (1).  
We find very similar results at the micro level. In Table 8 Panel B we examine expectational 
errors of individual CFOs. We use past year firm profitability and GDP growth as main 
predictors of expectational errors. Consistent with previous evidence at the aggregate level, 
expectational errors of individual CFOs are also strongly correlated with firm profitability and 
general economic conditions, in a way that appears to be extrapolative. At the firm level, as past 
year earnings over assets increase by one percentage point, next twelve month earnings growth 
tends to slow down by 0.06, whereas CFOs only expect it to slow down by 0.01 on average. This 
results in a difference of -0.05, as shown by Panel B column (1).  
Note that profitability is likely to be heterogeneous across firms, and the normal level of 
earnings over assets can be quite different for established firms than for young firms, and for 
firms in different industries (this can be of particular concern when we turn to the analyst sample, 
                                                        
21 During the period where we have CFO expectations, the standard deviation of past year earnings/asset is 0.88, and the 
standard deviation of expectational errors is 0.13. 0.88*0.09/0.13=0.6.  
22 To be conservative, past twelve month GDP growth also ends at quarter t-2 because GDP is reported with a lag,  
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which is much more heterogeneous than the CFO survey sample). To account for firm-specific 
average profitability, we include firm fixed effects. In the setting of error predictability 
regressions, strict exogeneity required by traditional fixed effect estimators may not be satisfied. 
Under the null of rational expectations, only sequential exogeneity will be satisfied. We perform 
robustness checks using dynamic panel estimators as in Arellano and Bover (1995),
23
 and results 
are very similar. For standard errors in firm-level tests, we always cluster by firm and we double 
cluster by both firm and time whenever the length of the panel makes it appropriate to do so.  
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 Panel B, we report results adding time fixed effects, which 
helps us assess the extent to which expectational errors load on the idiosyncratic component of 
firm profitability. By teasing out aggregate shocks, time fixed effects may also attenuate issues in 
rational expectations tests when the panel is relatively short (this can be a concern with the CFO 
panel, which spans seven years and 28 quarters, and is less of a concern with the analyst panel, 
which covers 28 years and 112 quarters).
24
 We find that CFOs seem to significantly extrapolate 
the idiosyncratic component of past profitability. Together, results in Table 8 show that the 
extrapolative structure of CFO expectations appears pervasive. Past year economic conditions, 
and both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic component of firm profitability, are all correlated 
with CFOs’ expectational errors. 
In Table 9, we perform the same set of tests as in Table 8 using analyst expectations. The 
results are similar: Analysts also tend to over-estimate next twelve month earnings growth when 
past year firm profitability is high and when past year economic conditions are favorable, and 
under-estimate future earnings growth when the past year is rough.  
At first glance, the patterns in CFO and analyst expectations are quite consistent with 
extrapolative biases observed in financial markets. As shown by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), 
many market participants—including both individual and institutional investors, as well as CFOs 
surveyed by Graham and Harvey—tend to extrapolate stock price trends formed in the past year. 
They generally think that past year’s trend would continue, whereas in reality it tends to revert. 
As explained in Section 2 and shown in Figure 1, investors tend to become significantly more 
                                                        
23 The forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) transformation studied by Arellano and Bover (1995) is most helpful as our CFO 
panel contains gaps.  
24 One possible concern is that time fixed effects may not completely tease out aggregate shocks if different firms are affected 
differently by an aggregate shock. For this to affect our results, it has to be that firms which happen to have a profitable past year 
are hit harder by an adverse aggregate shock, and vice versa. We do not find very compelling evidence for this concern.  
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optimistic about stock market performance in the next twelve months when market returns in the 
past year are high, and vice versa (Figure 1 Panel A). Corporate CFOs are equally extrapolative 
in their expectations about next twelve month market returns (Figure 1 Panel B). Piazzesi, 
Salomao, and Schneider (2015) also find that bond market investors tend to perceive interest rate 
trends to be more persistent than they are. The extrapolative tendency in expectations formation 
resonates with the well-known representativeness bias in human judgment (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which can lead people to view events similar to 
recent experiences as typical and likely, and to discount scenarios that are different from the 
prevailing situation (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015).  
While our evidence is consistent with extrapolation in earnings expectations, other factors 
may contribute to apparent deviations from rationality. In the following, we address a set of 
possible concerns. 
 
6.1 Alternative Explanations of Deviations from Rationality  
A. Misinterpretation of Survey Question  
First, we would like to make sure that the apparent errors in expectations do not simply 
reflect respondents misinterpreting the survey question. This could be a concern for CFO 
expectations, as CFOs are directly asked to provide forecasts of earnings growth in the next 
twelve months, and there could be alternative definitions of next twelve month earnings growth. 
This is not an issue, however, for analyst expectations, since analysts provide forecasts of total 
earnings in specific future quarters, and we compute the implied expected next twelve month 
earnings growth by combining their forecasts with actual past earnings; we then compare this 
variable to realizations to test forecast accuracy.
25
  
To be specific, while the CFO survey asks about earnings growth in the next twelve months 
defined as the percentage change of earnings in the next twelve months relative to earnings in the 
past twelve months, respondents could instead provide expectations about earnings twelve 
months from now relative to current earnings. If this were true, when we compare survey 
                                                        
25 In other words, in the case of analysts, we compute expected next twelve month earnings growth = analyst forecasts of 
earnings in the next twelve months/actual earnings in the past twelve months, and compare it to realized next twelve month 
earnings growth = actual earnings in the next twelve months/actual earnings in the past twelve months. We can alternatively 
normalize analyst forecasts of next twelve month earnings by current assets, and results are very similar.  
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responses to actual earnings growth in the next twelve months—which we follow the survey 
question to define as earnings in the next twelve months over earnings in the past twelve 
months—we might get spurious errors. For clarity of exposition, we denote next twelve month 
earnings growth defined by the survey as  
∆Earnings𝑡 = earnings in the next 12 months/earnings in the past 12 months.  
We denote the alternative interpretation as ∆Earnings𝑡
𝑎𝑙𝑡 = earnings 12 months from now/
current earnings, and we denote CFO responses as E𝑡
CFO. 
We provide two checks to show that respondents do not appear to misinterpret the question. 
First, Figure 2 shows that CFO responses and analyst expectations are quite consistent with each 
other when analyst expectations are computed following the survey definition of next twelve 
month earnings growth. However, if we instead compute analyst expectations of earnings four 
quarters from now relative to current earnings, the result looks much more different from CFO 
responses. Second and more importantly, if we compute actual earnings four quarters from now 
relative to current earnings (namely ∆Earnings𝑎𝑙𝑡) and compare it to CFO responses, then CFOs 
would appear much less accurate in their forecasts. In particular, while aggregate CFO responses 
are 0.54 correlated with ∆Earnings𝑡, it is only 0.1 correlated with ∆Earnings𝑡
𝑎𝑙𝑡. In addition, if 
we construct expectational error as ∆Earnings𝑡
𝑎𝑙𝑡 − E𝑡
CFO, this variable is still predictable by 
past twelve month profitability.
26
 Across all robustness checks, we find actual CFO responses 
are closest to the survey’s intended definition of next twelve month earnings growth, and by 
comparing CFO responses to ∆Earningst we obtain the most conservative results with respect 
to deviations from rationality.  
B. Asymmetric Loss Functions 
A common concern with forecast data is respondents might have asymmetric loss functions 
that cause them to report expectations that deviate from their objective views. For instance, 
analysts may want to please firm management and release upward biased forecasts (Lim, 2001). 
In the case of CFOs, reputational or other “publicity” considerations are unlikely to be at play, as 
individual responses in the CFO survey are never published. From this perspective, CFOs should 
                                                        
26 Relatedly, to test the accuracy of earnings expectations, it is highly important that we use the same earnings measure as CFOs 
and analysts. As mentioned in Section 3, we use pro forma actual earnings from IBES instead of GAAP earnings. The earnings 
measures we use are the ones CFOs report in earnings announcements and the ones analysts generally aim to match. In addition, 
we check that they are closest to CFO and analyst forecasts in terms of magnitude, variance, and variation over time. When 
compared to GAAP earnings, CFO and analyst expectations appear to be much less accurate, and error predictability remains.  
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not have much incentive to bias their responses for signaling purposes.  
The main challenge for explanations with asymmetric loss functions is to account for the 
time varying nature of expectational errors. Commonly used specifications of asymmetric loss 
functions (such as the LINEX function, and the Lin-Lin function under certain assumptions) 
generally yield optimal forecasts that are linear in objective expectations and conditional 
variance of the forecast variable. Given that conditional volatility of earnings tends to be higher 
in bad times, for asymmetric loss functions to generate more “pessimism” in bad times and more 
“optimism” in good times, over-predicting must be more costly than under-predicting. In this 
case, however, we would expect reported expectations to be consistently biased downwards 
(with the magnitude increasing in the size of the conditional variance), which is not the case for 
either CFOs or analysts.
27
  
While we do not find compelling reasons why asymmetric loss functions can drive our 
results, we nevertheless perform a set of robustness checks. In Table 8 and Table 9 we control for 
various proxies of volatility, including the VIX index and recent stock price volatility. We find 
that the volatility terms do not enter significantly, and our main results are unchanged. This 
evidence suggests that it is the level of past earnings that affects systematic forecast errors, 
whereas uncertainty plays a minor role. 
C. Risk Neutral Probability Weighting 
Another possible concern is that CFOs might be reporting expectations not under physical 
probabilities, but under certain types of risk neutral probabilities. Reporting expectations of 
future earnings growth is distinctively different from pricing, or calculation of expected returns 
of an asset. In the context of pricing, future cash flows may be discounted using a stochastic 
discount factor, or correspondingly, weighted by risk neutral probabilities. In the context of 
forecasting future earnings growth, it is not plausible that any discounting is present and that 
there is an associated stochastic discount factor from optimizing theories.
28
 It is possible that 
certain scenarios might be more salient in people’s minds that lead to distorted probability 
                                                        
27 One might also consider alternative scenarios where CFOs and analysts have time-varying loss functions. For this to explain 
our results, it has to be that people prefer to under-predict in bad times and to over-predict in good times. We do not find 
compelling reasons why it is optimal to follow this strategy. 
28 In addition, to the extent that high earnings are associated with low SDF (i.e. in general earnings are high in good states), 
earnings growth under risk neutral probabilities (which is always a well-defined mathematical object, though its economic 
interpretation may be unclear) will be consistently lower than earnings growth under physical probabilities. We find no evidence 
that either CFOs or analysts appear to be persistently pessimistic.  
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weighting, but this explanation would fall into the category of cognitive biases and non-rational 
expectations (Bordalo et al. 2012).  
D. Conditional Expectations vs. Other Conditional Moments 
Properties of rational expectations tests hold under the assumption that respondents provide 
conditional expectations of variables of interest. One concern could be that respondents might be 
reporting conditional medians, conditional modes, or other conditional moments instead of 
conditional expectations. For medians in particular, we can perform robustness checks with least 
absolute deviations regressions, which yield similar results to OLS. More generally, for this type 
of problem to affect our results, it has to be that following high past profitability the moment 
people report is greater than the conditional mean, and vice versa. We check the distribution of 
future earnings growth conditioning on past profitability, and do not find any evidence that 
conditional medians and modes follow this pattern (Appendix C Figure C1 plots the distribution 
of next twelve month earnings growth given a certain level of past profitability). Although we 
are not able to rule out the possibility that respondents report some other moments that happen to 
behave this way, it is not obvious what these moments could be and why respondents across 
different groups all prefer to use them. Certainly, more precise elicitation of expectations will be 
highly beneficial, as stressed by Manski (2004), but within available data, we do not find 
compelling evidence that the observed over-optimism and over-pessimism could be explained by 
respondents reporting alternative conditional moments.  
E. Information Rigidities and Rational Inattention 
Finally, recent research points to other frictions that can affect expectations formation, 
including information rigidities (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and inattention (Sims 2003, 2010). 
While these frictions are important in many economic settings, they may not be natural 
explanations for the extrapolative errors in CFOs’ and analysts’ earnings expectations. Although 
managers and analysts may not pay full attention to information such as GDP growth or inflation, 
it is not quite plausible that past firm earnings are not in their information set, or that such 
information just slips their minds. After all, earnings are quite important for firms, as well as for 
management compensation. Similarly, analysts, who are designated to forecast future earnings 
and whose performance is judged in part by the accuracy of their forecasts, are also unlikely to 
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be inattentive to earnings.
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In sum, our evidence points to systematic extrapolative biases in CFO and analyst 
expectations. While we cannot definitively rule out that some combinations of limited sample 
span, measurement error, and more complicated versions of informational frictions and loss 
functions could account for some these results, extrapolation stands out as the most parsimonious 
explanation. The findings also echo accumulating evidence in finance that extrapolation arises in 
many settings, and appears to be a common psychological tendency in expectations formation. 
 
7. Summary and Implications 
Our analysis of data on earnings expectations and investment yields two basic conclusions.  
First, expectations data appear to be extremely helpful in understanding corporate investment 
plans and actual investment, more so than some traditional measures of determinants of 
investment.  Second, several empirical tests appear to reject the rational expectations 
benchmark, pointing to the extrapolative nature of expectations.  
 At a minimum, the evidence endorses Manski’s (2004) call for collecting and using 
expectations data to evaluate economic theories. Our project would not have been possible 
without John Graham and Campbell Harvey’s CFO data. But as is often the case with a 
preliminary analysis and with limited data, there are many questions that we cannot address with 
the limited data we have.  
Yet even our preliminary results suggest some directions for future work. The finding that 
expectations do so well in accounting for investment plans and actual investment suggests a 
possible strategy for reviving the Q-theory of investment. It is well known that the standard 
Q-theory investment equation does not work well in levels, and requires first differencing to 
have some explanatory power (Barro 1990). Our findings, along with earlier research by 
Cummins et al. (2006), suggest that the problem may be not with the Q-theory itself, but with the 
stock market based measures of Tobin’s Q. This is not entirely surprising in light of the growing 
evidence of noisiness and non-fundamental fluctuations of stock prices (Shiller 1981, Morck et 
                                                        
29 We also test the extent to which expectational errors are predictable by the forecast itself or by past forecasts. We find that 
higher forecasts are associated with less-than-expected actuals, and vice versa. However, this result could be especially 
susceptible to the influence of measurement errors, as any random measurement error of the forecast would mechanically affect 
expectational errors. Thus we interpret it with extra caution.  
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al. 1990). A measure of investment opportunities based on actual expectations of corporate 
managers does much better in explaining investment, regardless of whether the equation is 
estimated in levels or in changes. A constructive way to revive Q-theory is to start with data on 
expectations, and not on stock market valuations.     
The second direction suggested by our evidence, as well as by the previous work, is the need 
to construct plausible models of expectations. In macroeconomics, in particular, such models 
have to come to grips with some version of the Lucas critique, which was applied initially 
precisely to Cagan’s and other models of adaptive expectations. In our view, market participants 
might be backward-looking and extrapolative to some extent, but surely they also have some 
ideas of how the economy evolves that are forward-looking. Developing models along these 
lines is an open problem. Our own approach has been to use psychological models of 
expectations that incorporate both forward and backward looking elements (e.g., Bordalo et al. 
2013; Gennaioli et al. 2015), but this research is still some way from being ready for a 
macroeconomic model.  
 The larger question of course is whether expectations have a significant role to play in 
macroeconomic modeling. A recent literature in macroeconomics considers expectations 
“shocks”, and discusses the extent to which they can contribute to economic fluctuations 
(Beaudry and Portier, 2004; Angeletos and La’O, 2009; Lorenzoni, 2009; Barsky and Sims, 2012; 
Angeletos and La’O, 2013; Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar, 2015). Our perspective is quite 
different; the evidence suggests that expectations have a fairly precise extrapolative structure, 
and do not just vibrate randomly. They are not noise; there is a systematic pattern of errors. 
Moreover, we believe – and our evidence seems supportive of this belief – that market 
participants make common expectational errors. Here we show that these errors are common to 
analysts and CFOs; we suspect the beliefs of policy makers are highly correlated with those of 
market participants. It seems to us that, as a consequence, plausible models would consider 
common errors among many economic agents, which therefore would have potential aggregate 
effects.   
The final question is whether such errors can account for some part of macroeconomic 
fluctuations, such as aggregate overbuilding in important sectors like the housing market, or 
prolonged recessions with a lack of corporate investment and hiring. Our data have limitations 
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for quantifying how the erroneous component of expectations affects investment, since the 
rational level of investment is not observable, but has to be inferred from making additional 
assumptions about the decision makers’ environment and information, which requires extra 
discretion. It is a further step still that a common error translates into aggregate investment 
distortions. We leave this to future work.   
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Stock Market Expectations of Investors and CFOs and Past Stock Returns 
 
The dashed line denotes S&P 500 index returns in the past twelve months. In Panel A, the solid line denotes expectations from the 
Gallup survey (% optimistic - % pessimistic about performance of the stock market in the next twelve months). In Panel B, the solid 
line denotes the average response in the CFO survey, to the question “Over the next year, I expect the average annual S&P 500 return 
will be: ___.” Frequency is quarterly. 
 
Panel A. Expectations in Gallup Survey and Past Year Stock Returns
 
 
Panel B. Expectations in CFO Survey and Past Year Stock Returns
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Figure 2. Expectations of Next Twelve Month Earnings Growth by CFOs and Analysts 
The solid line is aggregate CFO expectations of next twelve month earnings growth from the CFO survey. The dashed line is 
aggregate analyst expectations of next twelve month earnings growth computed from analyst EPS forecasts. Frequency is quarterly.  
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Figure 3. CFO Earnings Growth Expectations and Investment 
The plots below present aggregate CFO expectations of future earnings growth, aggregate planned investment growth, and aggregate 
actual investment growth. In Panel A, the solid line is aggregate CFO expectations of next twelve month earnings growth. The solid 
line with circles is aggregate planned investment growth in the next twelve months. In Panel B, the solid line is planned investment 
growth in the next twelve months fitted on contemporaneous CFO earnings growth expectations. The solid line with circles is 
aggregate planned investment growth in the next twelve months. The dashed line is actual growth of private non-residential fixed 
investment in the next twelve months. Frequency is quarterly. 
 
Panel A. CFO Earnings Expectations and Investment Plans
 
 
Panel B. CFO Earnings Expectations, Investment Plans, and Realized Investment 
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Figure 4. Errors in Earnings Expectations and Past Profitability: Time Series Plots 
The plots below show aggregate errors in earnings expectations and past twelve month corporate profitability. In both panels, the 
dashed line is aggregate earnings over assets in the past twelve months. In Panel A, the solid line is aggregate earnings growth in the 
next twelve months minus aggregate CFO expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. In Panel B, the solid line is 
aggregate earnings growth in the next twelve months minus aggregate analyst expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve 
months. Series are linearly detrended. Frequency is quarterly. 
 
Panel A. Errors in CFO Expectations and Past Year Profitability over Time 
 
 
Panel B. Errors in Analyst Expectations and Past Year Profitability over Time 
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Figure 5. Errors in Earnings Expectations and Past Profitability: Scatter Plots 
Scatter plots of aggregate errors in earnings expectations against past twelve month corporate profitability. Variables are identical to 
those in Figure 4. Frequency is quarterly. 
 
Panel A. Scatter Plot of Errors in CFO Expectations on Past Year Profitability 
 
 
Panel B. Scatter Plot of Errors in Analyst Expectations on Past Year Profitability 
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Table 1. Correlations among Different Measures of Investor Expectations  
of Stock Market Returns and Model-based Expected Returns 
This table shows correlations between different measures of investor expectations about future aggregate stock market returns, as 
well as correlations between survey expectations and discount rate proxies. Survey expectations variables are described in detail in 
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). CFO Survey refers to the Duke/CFO Magazine Survey, and AAII refers to surveys run by the 
American Association of Individual Investors. Investor Intelligence aggregates opinions expressed in newsletters published by 
institutional investors. Shiller denotes the survey led by Robert Shiller, and Michigan is University of Michigan Survey of 
Consumers. Horizon of survey expectations is mostly the next twelve months (Gallup, CFO survey, Shiller); the AAII survey asks 
about next six month expectations, and the horizon in Investor Intelligence and the Michigan survey varies. Among the discount rate 
proxies, log(D/P) denotes log dividend yield, cay refers to the consumption-wealth ratio in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and surplus 
consumption is constructed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Discount rate proxies are presented in a way so that the value is 
increasing in model-based expected returns (we use the negative of surplus consumption because high surplus consumption should be 
associated with low expected returns). Numbers in brackets denote p-values on the hypothesis that the correlation between the two 
series is zero. 
 
 
Gallup CFO Survey AAII 
Investor 
Intelligence 
Shiller Michigan 
CFO Survey  0.77  
     
 
[0.000] 
     
AAII 0.64  0.56  
    
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  
    
Investor Intelligence  0.60  0.64  0.55  
   
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
   
Shiller 0.39  0.66  0.51  0.43  
  
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
  
Michigan 0.61  -0.12  0.60  0.19  -0.56  
 
 
[0.003]  [0.922]  [0.003]  [0.395]  [0.020]  
 
Log(D/P) -0.33  -0.44  -0.31  -0.19  -0.55  -0.57  
 
[0.000]  [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.006]  
cay 0.02  0.14  -0.02  -0.19  0.37  0.00  
 
[0.776]  [0.380]  [0.788]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.988]  
-Surplus Consumption -0.48  -0.53  -0.28  -0.05  -0.67  -0.74  
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.191]  [0.000]  [0.000]  
Past 12m Stock Returns 0.78  0.36  0.37  0.43  0.05  0.44  
 
[0.000]  [0.018]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.578]  [0.042]  
Equity Fund Flows 0.70  0.71  0.41  0.20  0.33  0.40  
 
[0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.068]  
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Table 2. Expectations of Stock Returns and Realized Future Stock Returns  
This table presents results from Table 6 in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). The regressions are 𝑅𝑡
𝑥 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 where 𝑅𝑡
𝑥 
denotes next twelve month stock market returns (in excess of the risk free rate), and X is a predictor variable. The independent 
variables include measures of expectations from investor surveys and discount rate proxies. Selected investor expectations variables 
are starred to indicate that they are rescaled versions of the raw data. The rescaled versions can be interpreted in units of nominal 
stock returns. Details see Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). The regressions are monthly. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve 
lags. In columns (1) to (6), for each measure of survey expectations, we show the p-value on the test that b = 1 (which is the null 
under rational expectations). 
 
 
Realized Next 12m Aggregate Stock Market Returns 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Gallup* -1.985 
        
 
(-1.370) 
        
CFO Survey 
 
-0.021 
       
 
 
(-0.670) 
       
AAII* 
  
-1.655 
      
 
  
(-0.892) 
      
Investor Intelligence* 
   
-1.534 
     
 
   
(-2.323) 
     
Shiller* 
    
-0.612 
    
 
    
(-0.228) 
    
Michigan 
     
-0.081 
   
 
     
(-3.964) 
   
Log(D/P) 
      
0.072 
  
 
      
(1.424) 
  
cay 
       
3.095 
 
 
       
(3.031) 
 
-Surplus Consumption 
        
0.958 
 
        
(4.147) 
[p-val, b=1] [0.040] [0.000] [0.154] [0.000] [0.550] [0.000] 
   
N 132 39 285 579 123 22 579 579 579 
R
2
 0.057 0.03 0.015 0.036 0.004 0.342 0.03 0.107 0.116 
t-statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of firms covered in the CFO survey sample, analyst forecast sample, and full Compustat sample. Mean, median, 
standard deviation, and selected percentiles are presented. For comparability, all statistics are based on the sample period for which 
we have CFO expectations (2005 to 2012). 
Variable Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
  Panel A. Sample with CFO Expectations  
CFO expectations of  
next 12m earnings growth  
0.07  0.19  -0.25  0.02  0.10  0.15  0.30  
Realized next 12m earnings growth 0.09  0.48  -0.60  -0.11  0.09  0.26  0.85  
Realized next 12m earnings/asset 0.06  0.06  -0.02  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.16  
CFO expectations of  
next 12m capital spending growth 
0.05 0.23 -0.3 0 0.3 0.1 0.5 
Asset 21,808.42  101,176.00  80.48  541.10  1,959.22  6,453.33  44,791.00  
Market value 14,326.91  48,370.41  75.81  550.28  1,843.50  6,848.73  45,621.37  
Q 1.51  0.73  0.67  0.99  1.35  1.84  2.97  
BTM 0.49  0.31  0.16  0.29  0.41  0.60  1.06  
Annual net income/asset 0.03  0.17  -0.18  0.02  0.06  0.10  0.18  
Annual sales/asset 1.09 0.67 0.27 0.61 0.92 1.38 2.55 
Annual capx/asset 0.04  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.05  0.11  
Annual capx growth 0.13  0.53  -0.52  -0.18  0.06  0.33  1.11  
  Panel B. Sample with Analyst Forecasts 
Next 12m earnings growth implied by 
analyst EPS forecasts 
0.16  0.34  -0.31  -0.01  0.12  0.28  0.81  
Realized next 12m earnings growth 0.09  0.47  -0.65  -0.12  0.09  0.30  0.86  
Realized next 12m earnings/asset 0.07  0.05  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.10  0.16  
Asset 6,355.03  26,367.43  114.72  401.15  1,178.22  3,835.99  26,735.00  
Market value 6,610.21  23,094.48  129.51  473.98  1,287.45  3,887.96  25,692.68  
Q 1.53  0.83  0.65  0.93  1.29  1.90  3.27  
BTM 0.51  0.32  0.14  0.29  0.45  0.66  1.10  
Annual net income/asset 0.06  0.07  -0.03  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.17  
Annual sales/asset 1.12  0.63  0.32  0.64  1.00  1.46  2.37  
Annual capx/asset 0.05  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.04  0.07  0.15  
Annual capx growth 0.17  0.55  -0.54  -0.17  0.08  0.38  1.20  
 
Panel C. All Compustat Firms 
Asset 3,021.22  16,706.02  0.44  25.34  201.06  1,278.93  12,105.00  
Market value 3,684.34  16,780.76  17.35  107.49  433.32  1,726.60  14,127.71  
Q 1.53  0.91  0.61  0.88  1.24  1.90  3.51  
BTM 0.55  0.38  0.11  0.28  0.47  0.73  1.24  
Annual net income/asset -0.11  0.39  -0.87  -0.11  0.02  0.07  0.15  
Annual sales/asset 1.01  0.70  0.10  0.47  0.89  1.41  2.40  
Annual capx/asset 0.05  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.14  
Annual capx growth 0.16  0.68  -0.69  -0.28  0.04  0.42  1.53  
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Table 4. CFO Earnings Growth Expectations and Investment Plans: Aggregate Evidence 
This table presents aggregate quarterly regression ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃?̂?𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽E𝑡
∗[∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] + 𝜆𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. E𝑡
∗[∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] is aggregate CFO expectations 
of earnings growth in the next twelve months. ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃?̂?𝑡 is aggregate planned investment growth in the next twelve months. All control variables are 
measured at the end of quarter t-1. Past twelve month stock returns is index returns from the end of quarter t-5 to the end of quarter t-1. Past twelve 
month aggregate credit spread change is log change in credit spread from the end of quarter t-5 to the end of quarter t-1. Past twelve month changes 
in stock volatility and bloom policy uncertainty index, as well as past twelve month asset growth, are calculated in the same way (i.e. as the log 
difference between values at the end of quarters t-5 and t-1). Past twelve month change of net income/asset is net income from t-4 to t-1 normalized 
by asset at the end of quarter t-5 minus normalized net income in the previous four quarters. Past twelve month GDP (investment) growth is the log 
difference between GDP (investment) in quarters t-4 through t-1 and GDP (investment) in the previous four quarters. A constant is included but not 
reported, and a linear time trend is included. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
 
 Planned Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
CFO Expectations of  0.6313 0.5959 0.5869 0.4235 0.4853 0.5997 0.5435 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (9.39) (11.65) (11.40) (7.21) (12.83) (11.79) (9.78) 
Q   0.0532     
   (1.68)     
Past 12m Agg. Stock Returns    0.1082    
    (3.64)    
Past 12m Credit Spread Change     -0.0352   
     (-2.26)   
Log(D/P)      0.0271  
      (0.62)  
cay       -0.9700 
       (-1.86) 
Past 12m Asset Growth  0.2181 0.1461 0.0784 0.2643 0.2481 0.2536 
  (3.97) (2.39) (1.89) (5.88) (2.97) (3.92) 
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.616 0.660 0.672 0.741 0.685 0.663 0.674 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
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Table 4. Continued 
 
 Planned Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
       
CFO Expectations of  0.5969 0.5429 0.5301 0.5882 0.5573 0.4315 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (11.37) (8.20) (14.03) (8.55) (16.72) (8.21) 
Past 12m Credit Spread Change      -0.0447 
      (-1.49) 
Surplus Consumption  0.0154      
 (0.30)      
Past 12m Change of Net Income/Asset  0.0433    -0.0433 
  (1.70)    (-1.03) 
Past 12m Agg. Stock Vol Change   -0.0044   0.0421 
   (-0.37)   (2.51) 
Bloom Policy Uncertainty Index   -0.0328   -0.0303 
(Past 12m Change)   (-2.11)   (-2.23) 
Past 12m GDP Growth    0.6118  2.3154 
    (0.77)  (1.89) 
Past 12m Investment Growth     -0.1300 -0.5391 
     (-2.26) (-2.69) 
Past 12m Asset Growth 0.2114 0.1716 0.2376 0.0547 0.3859 0.4349 
 (3.40) (3.25) (4.22) (0.29) (6.21) (3.59) 
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.660 0.672 0.694 0.666 0.667 0.739 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
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Table 5. CFO Earnings Growth Expectations and Investment Plans: Firm-level Evidence 
This table presents firm-level quarterly regression ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛽E𝑖,𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] + 𝜆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡. E𝑖,𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] is firm-level CFO expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑃?̂?𝑖,𝑡 is firm-level planned investment growth in the next twelve months. All control variables are measured at the end of quarter t-1. Past twelve month firm stock returns, change of net income/asset, 
change of stock volatility, investment growth, and asset growth are firm-level counterparts of variables defined in Table 4. A constant is included but not reported, and firm fixed effects are included. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm. R-squared excludes firm fixed effects. 
 Planned Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
CFO Expectations of  0.4200 0.4259 0.4639 0.3487 0.3887 0.3713 0.4172 0.3420 0.4139 0.4233 0.3149 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (4.44) (4.50) (4.40) (3.25) (3.94) (3.99) (4.25) (3.16) (4.35) (4.28) (2.80) 
Q   0.0384         
   (1.53)         
BTM    -0.2303        
    (-4.32)        
Past 12m Firm Stock Returns     0.0833       
     (3.49)       
Past 12m Credit Spread Change      -0.1130     -0.1391 
      (-4.39)     (-2.99) 
Past 12m Change of Net Income/Asset       0.0025    0.0025 
       (2.23)    (1.16) 
Past 12m Firm Stock Vol Change        -0.0905   -0.0148 
        (-2.87)   (-0.33) 
Bloom Policy Uncertainty Index        -0.0764   0.0385 
(Past 12m Change)        (-2.35)   (0.96) 
Past 12m GDP Growth         1.0087  0.6293 
         (1.86)  (0.95) 
Past 12m Investment Growth          0.0010 0.0048 
          (0.05) (0.19) 
Past 12m Asset Growth  0.1163 0.1089 0.0529 0.0626 0.0964 0.0929 0.0393 0.0800 0.1276 0.0008 
  (1.37) (1.15) (0.63) (0.69) (1.17) (0.97) (0.40) (1.00) (1.39) (0.01) 
Observations 850 834 740 761 764 834 809 719 834 790 692 
R-squared 0.095 0.104 0.125 0.139 0.132 0.132 0.114 0.115 0.109 0.105 0.132 
Number of id 194 190 171 172 176 190 187 168 190 187 164 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
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Table 6. CFO Earnings Growth Expectations and Realized Investment Growth: Aggregate Evidence 
This table presents aggregate quarterly regression ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽E𝑡
∗[∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] + 𝜆𝑋𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. E𝑡
∗[∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] is aggregate CFO expectations 
of earnings growth in the next twelve months. ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑡 is next twelve month growth in private non-residential fixed investment. All control 
variables are the same as those in Table 4. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
 
 Realized Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
CFO Expectations of  0.7041 0.5903 0.5853 0.2799 0.2611 0.6278 0.4569 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (5.40) (8.14) (8.41) (3.52) (3.20) (7.38) (5.74) 
Q   0.0278     
   (0.37)     
Past 12m Agg. Stock Returns    0.1975    
    (4.20)    
Past 12m Credit Spread Change     -0.1035   
     (-3.82)   
Log(D/P)      0.2202  
      (2.68)  
cay       -2.4272 
       (-2.27) 
Past 12m Asset Growth  0.7021 0.6645 0.4473 0.8382 0.9458 0.7909 
  (6.48) (3.53) (3.43) (11.72) (10.36) (8.32) 
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.380 0.610 0.611 0.748 0.719 0.721 0.655 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
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Table 6. Continued 
 
 Realized Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
       
CFO Expectations of  0.5899 0.3727 0.3725 0.5563 0.5913 0.2168 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (8.43) (3.42) (6.22) (3.94) (6.57) (2.08) 
Past 12m Credit Spread Change      -0.0995 
      (-2.43) 
Surplus Consumption  -0.0097      
 (-0.06)      
Past 12m Change of Net Income/Asset  0.1779    0.0487 
  (3.06)    (0.88) 
Past 12m Agg. Stock Vol Change   -0.0362   0.0405 
   (-3.15)   (2.40) 
Bloom Policy Uncertainty Index   -0.0501   -0.0154 
(Past 12m Change)   (-2.48)   (-1.12) 
Past 12m GDP Growth    2.8443  3.2147 
    (1.68)  (1.88) 
Past 12m CAPX Growth     0.0032 -0.2927 
     (0.02) (-1.21) 
Past 12m Asset Growth 0.7063 0.5112 0.7221 -0.0570 0.6980 0.3239 
 (7.22) (5.00) (9.00) (-0.12) (2.40) (0.67) 
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.610 0.717 0.695 0.675 0.610 0.795 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
 
  
50 
 
Table 7. CFO Earnings Growth Expectations and Realized Investment Growth: Firm-level Evidence 
This table presents firm-level quarterly regression ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛽E𝑖,𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] + 𝜆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡. E𝑖,𝑡
∗ [∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠] is firm-level CFO expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is firm-level actual capital expenditure growth in the next twelve months. All control variables are the same as those in Table 5. A constant is included but not reported, and firm fixed effects are 
included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. R-squared excludes firm fixed effects. 
 Realized Investment Growth in the Next Twelve Months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
CFO Expectations of  0.5970 0.5930 0.5482 0.4069 0.3787 0.4118 0.6137 0.3243 0.5622 0.6043 0.3610 
Next 12m Earnings Growth (5.13) (5.04) (3.94) (3.23) (3.08) (3.47) (4.99) (2.53) (4.61) (4.83) (2.53) 
Q   0.1298         
   (1.88)         
BTM    -0.5246        
    (-4.51)        
Past 12m Firm Stock Returns     0.3047       
     (4.32)       
Past 12m Credit Spread Change      -0.3801     -0.1354 
      (-4.62)     (-1.43) 
Past 12m Change of Net Income/Asset       -0.0003    0.0002 
       (-0.08)    (0.05) 
Past 12m Firm Stock Vol Change        -0.4806   -0.3511 
        (-5.76)   (-3.24) 
Bloom Policy Uncertainty Index        -0.0844   0.0493 
(Past 12m Change)        (-0.96)   (0.54) 
Past 12m GDP Growth         2.4608  2.8272 
         (1.22)  (1.35) 
Past 12m CAPX Growth          -0.2917 -0.3074 
          (-4.68) (-4.26) 
Past 12m Asset Growth  0.3565 0.2850 0.1675 0.1914 0.3300 0.3371 0.1248 0.2582 0.6969 0.4428 
  (1.83) (1.36) (0.78) (1.00) (1.69) (1.69) (0.65) (1.36) (4.59) (2.48) 
Observations 852 845 760 784 788 845 819 741 845 810 717 
R-squared 0.043 0.054 0.063 0.086 0.103 0.125 0.057 0.175 0.060 0.152 0.271 
Number of id 193 193 172 176 180 193 189 170 193 187 166 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
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Table 8. Predicting Errors in CFO Expectations 
Quarterly regressions of errors in CFO expectations of next twelve months earnings growth on past profitability and past economic 
conditions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is aggregate earnings growth in the next twelve months minus aggregate CFO 
expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. Independent variables include aggregate earnings/asset and GDP 
growth in the four quarters prior to quarter t-1. Controls include VIX by the end of quarter t-1 and aggregate stock volatility as of 
quarter t-1. In Panel B, the dependent variable is firm-level earnings growth in the next twelve months minus firm CFO 
expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. Independent variables include firm-level earnings/asset in the four 
quarters prior to quarter t-1, and volatility of firm stock in quarter t-1. A constant is included by not reported. In Panel A, standard 
errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. In Panel B, standard errors are clustered by firm. R-squared excludes firm and time fixed 
effects.  
Panel A. Aggregate Evidence 
 Realized – CFO Expected Next 12m Earnings Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Past 12m Earnings/Asset (%) -0.0881  -0.0915  -0.0882  
 (-6.48)  (-8.85)  (-7.42)  
Past 12m GDP Growth  -3.2999  -3.6632  -4.2078 
  (-3.06)  (-3.38)  (-3.30) 
VIX   -0.2552 -0.3288   
   (-1.51) (-1.46)   
Agg. Stock Index Vol     -0.0089 -0.4101 
     (-0.02) (-1.52) 
       
Observations 57 57 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.335 0.225 0.361 0.266 0.335 0.269 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
 
Panel B. Firm-level Evidence  
 Realized – CFO Expected Next 12m Earnings Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Past 12m Firm Earnings/Asset (%) -0.0511  -0.0500  -0.0324 -0.0353 
 (-5.14)  (-5.22)  (-3.40) (-3.56) 
Past 12m GDP Growth  -4.1472  -2.811   
  (-2.44)  (-1.75)   
Firm Stock Vol   0.3959 0.2229  0.5299 
   (1.74) (0.94)  (1.13) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 606 651 594 638 606 594 
R-squared 0.082 0.032 0.103 0.033 0.037 0.050 
Number of id 142 147 139 144 142 139 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Table 9. Predicting Errors in Analyst Expectations  
Quarterly regressions of errors in analyst expectations of next twelve months earnings growth on past profitability and past economic 
conditions. In Panel A, the dependent variable is aggregate earnings growth in the next twelve months minus aggregate analyst 
expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. In Panel B, the dependent variable is firm-level earnings growth in the 
next twelve months minus analyst expectations of earnings growth in the next twelve months. All control variables are the same as in 
Table 8. A linear time trend is included. A constant is included by not reported. In Panel A, standard errors are Newey-West with 
twelve lags. In Panel B, standard errors are clustered by firm and time. R-squared excludes firm and time fixed effects.  
Panel A. Aggregate Evidence 
 Realized – Analyst Expected Next 12m Earnings Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Past 12m Earnings/Asset (%) -0.0456  -0.0550  -0.0467  
 (-3.68)  (-6.16)  (-3.76)  
Past 12m GDP Growth  -1.3940  -1.1277  -1.6171 
  (-1.70)  (-1.67)  (-1.64) 
VIX   -0.2904 -0.3260   
   (-1.73) (-2.52)   
Agg. Stock Index Vol     -0.0991 -0.1116 
     (-0.47) (-0.51) 
       
Observations 106 112 91 91 106 112 
R-squared 0.144 0.057 0.245 0.078 0.150 0.062 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are Newey-West with twelve lags. 
 
Panel B. Firm-level Evidence  
 Realized – Analyst Expected Next 12m Earnings Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Past 12m Firm Earnings/Asset (%) -0.0080  -0.0081  -0.0061 -0.0062 
 (-7.43)  (-7.36)  (-6.71) (-6.63) 
Past 12m GDP Growth  -1.6167  -1.6235   
  (-3.83)  (-3.72)   
Firm Stock Vol   0.0158 -0.0256  -0.0123 
   (0.26) (-0.50)  (-0.40) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects No Yes 
Observations 103,930 123,430 100,451 115,120 103,930 100,451 
R-squared 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 
Number of id 4,432 5,080 4,227 4,606 4,432 4,227 
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by firm and time. 
